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SUMMARY
What is the main reason for government debt accumulation in Canada? Is the main driver of debt the
public policy choices made by governments, or are non-policy factors, like interest rates and the
economic environment to blame? Answering this question is the first step for governments burdened by
high levels of government debt to introduce policies aimed at getting that debt under control. 
The effort to curtail debts in the mid-1990s prompted research into the sources of debt accumulation.
The goal of this research was to determine whether the cause of debt was a set of poor fiscal policy
choices in the form of overly generous social programs and/or insufficient taxation, an overly tight
monetary policy driving up interest costs on existing debt and slowing growth, or simply bad luck in the
form of unavoidable world events. That research aspired to identify the sources of debt accumulation
so those mistakes, once identified, might be avoided in the future. 
This paper looks at Ontario and Quebec; two provinces with high and growing debt to GDP ratios and
representing the two largest provincial economies in Canada. Introducing an original data set describing
the finances of these governments over the period 1980-81 to 2011-12 and a new approach for identifying
the causes of debt accumulation, this paper finds that the causes are disproportionate policy based.
Finally, this paper offers a way out of debt for these governments. The solutions demand difficult policy
choices; choices that will require a significantly heavier burden be borne by the citizens and taxpayers
of Ontario than those in Quebec. 
† The authors wish to acknowledge the helpful comments of two anonymous referees and those of
our colleague Bev Dahlby. We remain responsible for any errors or omissions.
INTRODUCTION
Concern over public sector debts tends to wax and wane in Canada. After 30 years of falling
debt-to-GDP ratios following WWII, debt ratios increased rapidly over the next 20 years,
peaking in the mid-1990s. At that time, governments halted the growth of debt ratios, and put
them on a downward path, with large and often controversial cuts to program expenditures and
increases in tax rates. After a decade of falling levels of public debt — a period during which
analysts debated whether the battle over public debt had been won1 — debt ratios have again
moved upward. Memories of the price Canadians paid in the past when their governments had
accumulated too much debt, like slower economic growth, higher interest rates, higher tax rates
and cuts to social programs, are stoking recent concerns that these costs might need to be paid
yet again. 
The effort to curtail debts in the mid-1990s prompted research into the sources of debt
accumulation. The goal of this research was to determine whether the cause of debt was a set of
poor fiscal policy choices in the form of overly generous social programs and/or insufficient
taxation, an overly tight monetary policy driving up interest costs on existing debt and slowing
growth, or simply bad luck in the form of unavoidable world events. That research aspired to
identify the sources of debt accumulation so those mistakes, once identified, might be avoided in
the future. 
Prominent in this debate was research by Pierre Fortin2 who used the arithmetic of the
government budget constraint to isolate factors that can lead to an increase in a government’s
debt-to-output ratio. Applying his approach to data describing the federal government’s budget,
Fortin concluded that the structure of federal government programs played no part in the debt
explosion and fingers should be pointed instead at the interest rate policies of the Bank of
Canada for being ultimately responsible for the accumulation of federal government debt.3
In an effort to sharpen understanding of the issues, Ron Kneebone and Jack Leach4 investigated
the significance of Fortin’s assumptions and offered a different interpretation of the causes of
debt accumulation. Their conclusion, namely that fiscal policy choices and changes due to the
business cycle were equally responsible for the run-up of the federal debt-to-output ratio, stood
in sharp contrast to Fortin’s claims that fiscal policy choices should not be held responsible at
all.
1 See Is the Debt War Over? Dispatches from Canada’s Fiscal Frontline, Christopher Ragan and William Watson (eds),
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004.
2 See Pierre Fortin, “The Canadian Fiscal Problem: The Macroeconomic Connection,” in Pierre Fortin and Lars Osberg,
eds., Unnecessary Debts, ed. P. Fortin and L. Osberg (Toronto: Lorimer), 1996. Also see Fortin’s “The Great Canadian
Slump,” Canadian Journal of Economics 29(4):761 – 87, 1996 and “The Canadian Standard of Living: Is There a Way
Up?” C.D. Howe Institute Benefactors Lecture 1999. 
2 These claims in turn prompted a response from analysts with the Bank of Canada claiming biases in Fortin’s approach
that placed too much blame on the central bank. See Charles Freedman and Tiff Macklem, “A Comment on ‘The Great
Canadian Slump’,” Canadian Journal of Economics 31(3):646 – 65, 1998. Fortin’s conclusions were cited by those
who argued that adjustments to social programs should not, therefore, be part of the effort at debt reduction. See for
example, Linda McQuaig, Shooting the Hippo (Toronto: Penguin Books Canada), 1996.
4 Ronald Kneebone and John Leach, “The Accumulation of Public Debt in Canada,” Canadian Public Policy, Volume
27, No. 3, September 2001.
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In this paper we revisit this debate in two ways. First, we offer what we consider to be a better
measure of the amount of debt that can be deemed the responsibility of policy makers as
opposed to external forces beyond their control. Second, we bring the debate to the level of
individual provinces.5
Understanding the sources of debt accumulation at the provincial level is at least as important
as understanding the issue at the federal level. Provincial governments in Canada control about
40 per cent of all government program spending, thus provincial debt accumulation is as much
a concern as debt accumulation at the federal level. Moreover, the expenditure obligations of
provincial governments — particularly in the realm of health care — are such that in future
they face a far greater challenge to controlling levels of debt than does the federal government.
Finally, whereas government debt at the federal level is falling as a fraction of GDP, the
opposite is currently true at the provincial level. Identifying the reasons behind the recent
growth in provincial government debt is therefore timely. 
This paper will also contribute to the broader literature examining provincial budgets by
providing a data-set describing the finances of individual provinces for the period from 1980-
81 to 2012-13. As we explain in the next section of this paper, Statistics Canada has halted,
with data spanning the period 1988-89 to 2008-09, the publication of its Financial Management
System (FMS) data series describing details of provincial government finances. If, or until, this
data series is continued, analysts have nothing to measure the influence on provincial
government finances of the 2008-09 recession, the following recovery or the implications of
the 1981-82 recession and the period of strong economic growth that followed up to 1989. Our
data set rectifies these shortcomings of the more limited FMS data series.
This is the first of a series of reports on the public finances of Canadian provinces. This report
uses public accounts data for the period 1980-81 to 2011-12 to summarize, describe and analyze
the finances of the governments of Ontario and Quebec; those provinces with the most
diversified and manufacturing-reliant economies. Future reports will apply this approach to the
other provinces according to their most important economic characteristics. Relying on the
simple arithmetic of debt accumulation implied by the government budget constraint, the
sources of debt accumulation are identified, and inform a discussion of how much of the change
in provincial debt can be laid at the feet of policy choices as opposed to economic conditions.
THE DATA
Out of fear it may bore the reader, it is not generally good form to include a discussion of the
data in the body of a research paper. For this project, however, the construction of the dataset is
central, and therefore worthy of elaboration.
Information on provincial government finances comes from provincial public accounts. These
data employ accounting standards and approaches that differ across provinces and which
change over time. These data can be used in the form they are reported or they can be used
after certain modifications have been made to make them somewhat more comparable over
time and across provinces. Both approaches involve challenges. 
5 Kneebone and Leach took a step in this direction but only looked at the budgets of all provinces in aggregate.
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3Statistics Canada’s Financial Management System (FMS) attempts to make certain
modifications to public accounts data. While the FMS data imposes a certain degree of
uniformity on the public accounts data published by each province, Statistics Canada notes that
this effort can never be complete.6 Moreover, the advantage of using data that imposes some
degree of uniformity on public accounts data is offset by certain drawbacks to the accounting
conventions FMS employs. In particular, the royalty revenue that provincial governments
collect from the sale of natural resources is not reported separately in the FMS data. Rather,
these revenues are included in the category of “investment income” and so, cannot be
distinguished from the income provincial governments earn from financial assets and other
sorts of investments. This is problematic given the importance of royalty income for many
provinces and given the unique determinants of royalty income from other investment returns.
The usefulness of FMS data is also severely limited by the fact that the information they
provide on provincial finances start only in 1988-98 and end in 2008-09.7 Understanding the
evolution of provincial government debt accumulation is enhanced by having a dataset
describing a longer period of time. 
Another source of information on provincial government finances is available from Statistic
Canada’s Provincial Economic Accounts (PEA). These data differ from the FMS data by
reporting on a calendar, rather than fiscal year basis and by reporting on different aggregates of
provincial finances. Thus, while the FMS data report provincial spending on functional
categories such as health, education and social services, the PEA data report on the much
broader category of “net current expenditures on goods and services.” As part of the goal of
this paper is to identify the implications of debt reduction on spending on items like health and
education, the PEA data is less useful. Like the FMS data, the PEA data set is also limited by
having been terminated by Statistics Canada — with the last year of data being provided was
2009.8
The dataset we have constructed uses data as reported in provincial public accounts without
any attempt at enforcing uniformity of accounting practices across provinces.9 While this
reduces the ability to make provincial comparisons, it gains the ability to treat natural resource
revenues (royalties) differently from other sources of investment income and, most importantly,
enables the construction of a dataset that spans any period described by public accounts. 
6 For a discussion, see Financial Management System (FMS), Statistics Canada, 2009,
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/68f0023x/68f0023x2006001-eng.pdf).
7 Statistics Canada is moving to a new approach to measuring government financial statistics and has indicated that it
intends to soon begin publishing data based on its new accounting framework starting with fiscal year 2008-09. We
are not aware of any statement suggesting that a revision to historical data will accompany the adoption of the new
accounting framework.
8 On the revenue side, the PEA does allow a reasonably close comparison to our data for certain revenue categories.
Thus, the PEA reports, for calendar years 1981-2009, the amount of direct taxes collected from persons by provincial
governments; a data series that is closely comparable to our data on personal income tax collected. After making a
rough adjustment to these calendar year data to allow a comparison to our fiscal year data we find the two sets of data
have a 98 per cent correlation and that on average our data is equal to 96 per cent of the data reported in the PEA.
9 The Appendix presents our data on provincial government revenues and expenditures as reported in public accounts.
Simply collecting these data proved challenging. We enthusiastically add our voices to the complaint recently
expressed by Colin Busby and William Robson over the lack of transparency and consistency in provincial
government financial accounting. See “Credibility on the (Bottom) Line: The Fiscal Accountability of Canada’s
Senior Governments, 2013,” Commentary No. 404, C.D. Howe Institute, March 2014.
This paper focuses on the period from 1980-81 to 2011-12.10 This enables the analysis to
capture the effects on provincial finances of the 1980-81 recession, the strong period of
economic growth prior to 1990, and the impact on provincial finances of the economic
recovery since the end of the 2008-09 recession; influences on provincial finances that could
not be studied at all using FMS data or fully studied using PEA data.
It is worth noting that the Fiscal Reference Tables (FRT) published by the federal Department
of Finance also present data from provincial public accounts and largely adopts the practice of
not trying to enforce uniformity in provincial accounting. The FRT, however, do not offer a
breakdown of total spending and total revenue into sub-categories. Thus, to obtain data on
revenue collected by provincial governments by type — personal and corporate income taxes,
etcetera — and to determine program spending by program — health, education, etcetera —
one must go directly to the public accounts of individual provinces. Accessing this finer
gradation of spending and revenue is important to understanding the sources of revenue and
spending changes and is also important for identifying, as is done below, what portions of
revenue and spending changes are due to the business cycle as opposed to policy choices.
It is important to emphasize that the focus of this study is only on that portion of provincial
budgets referred to as the “operations account” (in Ontario) and the “general fund” (in
Quebec); what will be referred to here as the government’s operating account. The budgetary
and debt implication of extraordinary public infrastructure investments is ignored. Thus, data
for Quebec does not include the implications for the provincial government’s net debt of the
Generations Fund, Special Funds, and extraordinary losses such as those associated with the
recent closing of the Gentilly nuclear plant. Similarly, in Ontario, we ignore extraordinary
adjustments to net debt caused by, for example, the $20.9 billion of debt absorbed by the
government in 1999-2000 to facilitate the privatization of Ontario Hydro.11
The accumulation over time of deficits in the operating account defines what is referred to as
the accumulated deficit.12 The government of Quebec is quite explicit about the meaning of the
debt representing the accumulation of deficits on the operating account;
It represents the government’s “bad debt”, i.e., the debt that does not
correspond to an asset, financial or non financial. It is often said that this is
the debt incurred to “pay for the groceries”.13
10 As described below our approach involves ratios of debt to GDP. The choice of time span therefore reflects in part
the availability of a consistent data series on provincial GDP. Calendar year values of provincial GDP are available
for the period 1980 to 2012 (sources are provided below). Data for 2013 are required – but not yet available – to use
budget data for fiscal year 2012-13. 
11 The $20.9 billion figure is reported in Public Services for Ontarians: A Path to Sustainability and Excellence, a
report of the Commission on the Reform of Ontario’s Public Services
(http://www.fin.gov.on.ca/en/reformcommission/). The report is more popularly known as the Drummond Report
named after Don Drummond, Chair of the Commission.
12 These governments report a measure they refer to as the accumulated deficit. Those measures differ from ours by
including adjustments involving other than the operating account (the general fund in Quebec and the operations
account in Ontario). In Ontario, for example, the government figure includes consideration of non-financial assets in
the broader public sector while in Quebec the government figure includes additions to and subtractions from a
stabilization fund. 
13 See Finances et Économie Québec, http://www.finances.gouv.qc.ca/en/page.asp?sectn=36&contn=329
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The ratio of accumulated deficits to GDP stands in contrast to what governments report as their
net debt, a measure that includes in its calculation the implications of extraordinary additions
to debt of the sort referred to above. Net debt, then, represents a broader definition of the
government’s debt than the accumulated borrowing required to “pay for the groceries.” 
Between 1980-81 and 2011-12, accumulated deficits increased by $142.1 billion in Ontario and
$85.4billion in Quebec (all figures measured in nominal dollars). This is the increase in debt
which we try to explain in this paper. Over that same period, net debt increased by $223.6
billion in Ontario and by $152.8 billion in Quebec. The difference in the change in net debt and
the change in accumulated deficits — $81.5 billion in Ontario and $67.4 billion in Quebec —
is the accumulation of net debt since 1980-81 that has been the result of extraordinary
expenditures outside of the operating account. No effort is made to explain this portion of the
total increase in provincial debt.14
THE SOURCES OF DEBT ACCUMULATION
Households are constrained in their spending choices by their incomes and by what they are
able to borrow. This simple fact of life has the important implication that the choices available
to households are constrained by the economic environment in which they operate. A
household facing high interest rates for borrowing and slow income growth is more limited in
its spending choices than when interest rates are low and income is growing rapidly. A
household that fails to adjust its spending when interest rates rise and income shrinks soon
finds itself in financial trouble. In a nutshell, this is the reasoning behind the approach
employed in this study to identify what portion of provincial government debt can be identified
as due to policy choices as opposed to economic conditions.
The following equation defines a budget constraint for a government’s current account balance:
Dt – Dt–1 =  PDEFt + rtDt–1
where we define
PDEFt = primary deficit (program spending less current account revenue) in year t15
Dt–1 = accumulated deficit of the current account at beginning of year t
Dt = accumulated deficit of the current account at end of year t
rt = average interest rate on net debt in year t.
14 The Appendix reports levels of net debt and accumulated deficits by fiscal year. Constructing an accumulated deficit
series required an initial value for the first year (1980-81) in this dataset. In Ontario, government accounts do not
distinguish between net debt and accumulated deficits until 2002-03. It is assumed, therefore, that in 1980-81, the
accumulated deficit was equal to net debt. In Quebec, that government’s measure of the accumulated deficit for
1980-81 was used, as is reported in Table 16 of Historical Data, Budget 2012-2013, Finances Québec. Throughout
this paper the emphasis is on explaining the change in the accumulated deficit and so the starting value is not critical.
15 The primary deficit can take on a negative or a positive value. If program spending is less than tax revenue the
primary deficit has a negative value and may be referred to as a primary surplus. Program spending includes all
government spending except debt service which is represented here as rtDt-1. At the provincial level of government
the largest programs are health, education and social services.
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Some elements of the program spending and revenue in the current account are sensitive to the
state of the economy (the business cycle). To account for these cyclical influences, one can
write;
Dt – Dt–1 =  (PDEFt – PDEFt*) + PDEFt* + rt Dt–1 (1)
where PDEF* defines the cyclically-adjusted primary deficit and the term in brackets defines
the size of the primary deficit that is due to the business cycle.
Of interest is the identification of sources of change in the ratio of the accumulated deficit to
GDP, referred to more simply as the debt ratio. It makes sense to compare debt to GDP as the
latter defines the collective income of the province’s citizens, and so, measures the capacity for
managing debt. Of interest, then, is explaining movements in;
Dt
–
Dt–1
Yt Yt–1
where Y is GDP. Using equation (1) and noting that values of Yt and Yt–1 are related by the rate
of growth in GDP in the following way;
Yt = (1 + (nt – nt*) + nt*)Yt–1
where
n = the rate of growth in Y
n* = the rate of growth in potential output, Y*,
the change in the debt ratio can be written as;
Dt
–
Dt–1
= (PDEFt – PDEFt* – (nt – nt*) Dt–1) + [PDEFt* + (rt – nt*) Dt–1]Yt Yt–1                 Yt       Yt                        Yt                              Yt                           Yt (2)
The term in round brackets defines the cyclical component. It identifies the change in the debt
ratio that is due to the economy being away from potential (or full employment) output and
experiencing a rate of growth that differs from the rate of growth in potential output. The term
in square brackets defines the policy component. It identifies the change in the debt ratio that is
due to fiscal policy choices.16
16 In the equation, the growth and interest rates are either nominal rates or real rates, but in the latter case, the interest
rate must be the ex post real interest rate. It is worth noting that no attempt is made to identify how the interest rate
might vary with the business cycle. This reflects an assumption that the interest rate does not react automatically to,
or in a predictable way with, the business cycle.
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Discussion
The accounting used to identify that part of the annual change in the debt ratio due to the
economic cycle (the cyclical component) versus that which is due to fiscal policy choices (the
policy component) differs from that used in the literature. The approach used here is most
closely akin to that defended by Kneebone and Leach.17 It differs by the inclusion of the last
term defining the cyclical component. This consideration is important for explaining the
change in the ratio of debt to GDP, since an economic slowdown affects not only the numerator
by causing change in income-sensitive components of the primary deficit — and so, causes a
gap between PDEF and PDEF* — but also influences GDP itself — and so, causes a gap
between the observed rate of growth in GDP, n, and the rate of growth in potential output, n*. 
The measure of the cyclical component used here is based on the simple observation that
because some components of provincial program spending (such as social assistance payments)
and income sensitive tax revenues rise and fall with the level of output, and since the level of
GDP varies with the business cycle, then the ratio of debt to GDP will be sensitive to the state
of the economy. Accusing a government of fiscal irresponsibility when its debt ratio is made
large by the effects of recession is not fair. As such, this measure of the cyclical component
identifies the change in the debt ratio due to the state of the economy, and so, identifies
changes not considered grounds for criticism of fiscal policy choices.
It is important to stress that while the first term on the right hand side of equation (2) is
labelled the cyclical component, its size is not “policy free”. Its magnitude is affected by the
extent to which governments make their revenues and spending obligations sensitive to
changes in income. The cyclical component, then, shows the change in the debt ratio due to the
business cycle impacting the government budget via the current set of tax rates and the current
design of spending programs. Movements in the cyclical component, then, reflect the operation
of automatic stabilizers the size of which is a matter of policy.
The measure of the policy component is motivated by the idea that fiscal policy choices are
constrained by the level of debt inherited from previous governments and by the economic
conditions determining the interest rate paid on outstanding debt, the rate of growth in the tax
base and the levels of cyclically-sensitive spending and revenues. Depending on economic
circumstances — particularly those determining the relative values of the interest rate due on
outstanding debt and the rate of growth in potential output — the same set of fiscal policy
choices reflected in the value of the cyclically-adjusted primary deficit PDEF* may or may not
be labelled fiscally irresponsible. 
To better appreciate this point, it is easy to see from the definition of the policy component that
if the levels and growth rates of actual and potential output are equal, there is no tendency for
the debt-to-output ratio to rise only if:
PDEFt* = (nt* – rt) Dt–1 (3)
The term on the right-hand side is our preferred target for a fiscally responsible set of fiscal
policy choices. The debt-to-output ratio will tend to rise as a consequence of fiscal policy
choices when PDEFt* is above the target, and tend to fall when PDEFt* is below the target. 
17
“The Accumulation of Public Debt in Canada.”
7
As noted by Kneebone and Leach, implicit in this argument is the idea that requiring the
cyclically-adjusted primary deficit, PDEF*, to be zero is not a very good measure of fiscal
probity.18 Governments with outstanding debt cannot spend as if they were not responsible for
paying the interest on the outstanding debt they have inherited. Their cyclically-adjusted
primary deficits can be positive when the interest rate is low and the rate of growth in potential
output is high (r < n*), but they should be negative when the interest rate is high and the rate
of growth in potential output is low (r > n*). 
When, as has often been the case since the 1980’s, governments operate in a high interest rate,
low growth environment, establishing a zero value for the cyclically-adjusted primary deficit is
clearly irresponsible and is not a sign of fiscal probity. In this economic environment, the
government’s objective should be to operate with cyclically-adjusted primary surpluses and so
offset the effect on the debt ratio of operating in a low growth — high interest rate environment.
In what follows, the definitions of the cyclical and policy components are applied to the data
defining the government’s operating account. It is useful to emphasize our focus on the
operating account because it adds credence to the definition of the policy component. That is,
the idea behind governments defining an operating account is to emphasize that the revenues in
that account are to be used to pay for current spending (or “paying for the groceries”). The so-
called “golden rule” of public finance is that operating accounts ought to be such that, in the
normal course of events, they balance spending with revenues. In other words, the application
of the golden rule is that at full employment the operating account should not be causing the
debt ratio to increase. Applying the golden rule of public finance would require that, our
definition of the policy component be zero at full employment, and that over time, when
economic downturns have been balanced by economic booms, the accumulated deficits of the
government’s operating account should be zero.
POTENTIAL OUTPUT AND THE CYCLICALLY-ADJUSTED PRIMARY DEFICIT 
The accounting framework requires that one identify cyclically adjusted provincial revenue and
spending and use these values to define the cyclically-adjusted primary deficit, PDEF*. This, in
turn, requires estimates of potential output, Y*, and its rate of growth, n*.
It is common practice to generate values of provincial potential GDP (Y*) by applying the
Hodrick-Prescott filter to observed values of GDP (Y). The HP filter is intended to decompose
data on GDP into trend and cycle components.19 The attraction of the HP filter is that its
18 Kneebone and Leach note that one might argue that setting PDEF* = 0 is a sensible target for fiscal responsibility if
a long enough time horizon is chosen. That is, a government that equates cyclically-adjusted program spending with
revenue has a neutral impact on the debt-to-output ratio if, over a period of time, the average value of the term on the
right hand side of equation (3) is zero. Canada's experience in this regard is the same as that of many western
economies: The Second World War was followed by a quarter century in which growth rates exceeded interest rates
and then a quarter century in which interest rates exceeded growth rates. A policymaker would need a very long
planning horizon before fiscal responsibility might be sensibly defined as maintaining a zero value of the cyclically-
adjusted primary deficit.
19 The HP filter is applied to measures of provincial real GDP. Multiplying these measures by the GDP implicit price
deflator yields an estimate of Y* measured in nominal dollars. Data on provincial real and nominal GDP is from
CANSIM Table 3840038. These data are calendar year measures that span the period 1981-2012, inclusive. Since the
data on provincial finances are measured on a fiscal year basis (April 1st to March 31st) fiscal year version of Y and
Y* is calculated using the formula FYt = 0.25CYt + 0.75CYt-1.
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application involves a minimum of judgment and requires a minimum of data. What’s more,
the resulting smooth but non-linear time series of potential output accords with most analysts’
expectations of the evolution of that series.20,21,22
To arrive at estimates of the cyclically-adjusted primary deficit, PDEF*, we employ an
approach utilized by the IMF, the OECD and other research organizations.23 Cyclically
sensitive components of the provincial budget are adjusted proportionately to the ratio of
potential output to observed output, as determined by its elasticity with respect to the output
gap. Thus,
Ti*,t = Ti,t (Yt*/Yt)αi αi > 0 
Sj*,t = Sj,t (Yt*/Yt)βj βj > 0
where Ti,t = observed revenue from revenue type i in year t, Sj,t = observed expenditure on
program j in year t, starred variables are values that would be observed at potential output, and
αi, βj are elasticities measuring the sensitivity to output of revenue category i and program
expenditure j, respectively. Once values of Ti*,t and Sj*,t are calculated, the remaining (non-
adjusted) categories are added in order to derive structural total revenues and expenditures.
20 A problem with using the HP filter is the so-called end-point problem; the fact the approach causes estimates of
potential output at the beginning and at the end of the time series to be close to observed values of output. To deal
with this issue, we follow a frequently used approach that involves extending the data series on output beyond the
end, and prior to the beginning, of the study’s sample period. Marianne Baxter and Robert King (“Measuring
Business Cycles: Approximate Band-Pass Filters for Economic Time Series,” Review of Economics and Statistics,
Vol. 81, 1999) recommend adding at least three years of data (when using annual data) to each end of the sample
period. Three years of data on provincial nominal output prior to 1981 (for years 1978-1980, inclusive) is taken from
CANSIM series v123698 (Quebec) and v123985 (Ontario). In lieu of an implicit price deflator we rely on provincial
measures of the consumer price index from CANSIM series D45062 (Quebec) and D45083 (Ontario) for those years.
Forecasts of real and nominal provincial output for three years beyond the end of our sample (2013-2015) are taken
from TD Economics, Provincial Economic Forecast, January 15, 2014.
21 An alternative approach to using the HP filter is to estimate an aggregate production function relating output to the
inputs producing that output. The modelling requirements of this approach are significant as are the data
requirements with the latter issue particularly acute at the sub-national level. Using Canadian provincial data, Yvan
Guillemette (“A Simulation Model of Federal, Provincial, and Territorial Government Accounts for the Analysis of
Fiscal-Consolidation Strategies in Canada,” OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 800, August 2010)
shows that the production function approach yields similar estimates of provincial potential output to those produced
by the HP filter.
22 A way of evaluating the “reasonableness” of estimates of potential output is to observe the value of the provincial
unemployment rate in those years when our estimate of Y* is equal to observed output, Y. The unemployment rate in
those years should be consistent with one’s estimate of the full-employment (or ‘natural’) level of the unemployment
rate. The values of potential output in Ontario and Quebec suggest that both of these provinces were at or near full
employment in 1999 and again in 2008.  In those years, the unemployment rate was 6.3 per cent and 6.6 per cent in
Ontario and 9.3 per cent and 7.3 per cent in Quebec. As such, both the level and the change over time (falling in
Quebec and slowly rising in Ontario) in these values accord with the views of most economists regarding the natural
rate of unemployment in those provinces and in Canada.
23 See, for example, Fabian Bornhorst, Gabriela Dobrescu, Annalisa Fedelino, Jan Gottschalk and Taisuke Nakata,
“When and How to Adjust Beyond the Business Cycle: A Guide to Structural Balances,” IMF Fiscal Affairs
Department, Technical Notes and Manuals, April 2011; Nathalie Girouard and Christophe Andre, “Measuring
Cyclically-adjusted Budget Balances for OECD Countries,” OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 434,
2005; and Martin Larch and Alessandro Turrini, “The Cyclically-adjusted Budget Balance in EU Fiscal Policy
Making: A Love at First Sight Turned into a Mature Relationship,” Economic Papers 374, European Commission,
March 2009.
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The elasticity values used here, and the budget categories to which they are applied, are those
suggested for application to Canadian data by the IMF. Specifically, the IMF suggests an
elasticity value of 0.7 for personal income tax revenue, 1.5 for corporate income tax revenue,
1.0 of indirect tax revenue, 1.0 for other tax revenue, and -0.1 for program expenditures.24
Applying data to equation (2) also requires a value of the interest rate, rt, observed in each year
for each government. For this purpose an effective rate of interest paid by these governments is
calculated as the amount paid in debt charges in year t divided by the amount of net debt
inherited from year t-1.
WHO, OR WHAT, IS TO BLAME FOR DEBT ACCUMULATION?
In this section, data describing the operating accounts of Ontario and Quebec are applied to the
accounting framework described by equation (2). It is shown how this framework can be used
to determine to what extent the fiscal policy choices of these two governments can be held
responsible for the accumulation of debt.
Ontario
Figure 1 shows the annual change in the ratio of accumulated deficits to GDP (the debt ratio)
due to the influence of the business cycle (the cyclical component) and due to policy choices
(the policy component). It also identifies the political affiliation of the government in power.
Each of the coloured bars identifies the increase in the debt ratio, measured in percentage
points of GDP, due to elements identified in equation (2). Bars above the zero line indicate the
influence is such to cause the debt ratio to increase; bars below the line indicate the influence
is in the direction of reducing the debt ratio. The blue line identifies the vertical sum of the
bars for any year, and so, measures the total observed change in the debt ratio for that year. For
example, in Ontario in 1986-87, one bar defines an influence pushing the debt ratio upward
while the other defines an influence pulling the debt ratio downward. The bars are of nearly
equal size indicating that, as shown by the blue line, there was no overall change in the debt
ratio in that year. Over the entire period from 1982-83 to 2011-12, the ratio of accumulated
deficits to GDP increased by 13.1 percentage points of GDP.
24 As reported in Bornhorst, et. al. “How and When to Adjust Beyond the Business Cycle,” results are not terribly
sensitive to alternative choices of these elasticity values. The values used are those suggested for Canada in the
template accompanying that paper (http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/strfiscbal/index.htm). Guillemette, “A
Simulation Model,” provides estimates for budget elasticities that are province-specific. With one exception, the
elasticities he identifies for Ontario and Quebec do not differ significantly from what the IMF suggests for Canada
(and which we use). The exception is the elasticity of personal income tax revenue which Guillemette determines to
be only 0.4 in Quebec.
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FIGURE 1: ONTARIO
The yellow bars identify the cyclical component. Not surprisingly, the cyclical component was
responsible for the debt ratio increasing during periods of recession in the early 1980s, the
early 1990s and beginning in 2008. Periods of strong economic growth — the mid 1980s and
from the mid 1990s to mid-2000s — saw the debt ratio fall as cyclically-sensitive revenues
increased and cyclically-sensitive expenditures fell. Over the entire period from 1982-83 to
2011-12, the business cycle was responsible for none of the increase in Ontario’s debt ratio;
policy choices were wholly responsible for the increase in the debt ratio over this period.
The cyclical component is influenced by two considerations; by the deviation of output, Y,
from potential output, Y* (which causes the observed primary deficit, PDEF, to deviate from its
value at potential output, PDEF*) and by the deviation of the observed growth rate of output,
n, from the growth rate of potential output, n*. Calculating that portion of the cyclical
component due only to n being different from n* provides an estimate of what would have
happened to the debt ratio had governments continually adjusted tax rates and continually
adjusted spending programs to always keep PDEF = PDEF*. In other words, one would be
showing the result of governments intentionally short-circuiting automatic stabilizers. This
exercise shows that in Ontario, had governments behaved in this fashion over the entire period
of our sample, they would have only reduced the debt ratio by 1.45 percentage points. The
implication is that automatic stabilizers, over the 32 years of our sample, had a minimal impact
on the accumulated deficit.  
The black bars identify the change in the debt ratio due to the policy component. The policy
component shows the effect on the debt ratio of discretionary changes in revenues and
spending. A positive value for the policy component indicates that, given the economic
environment as defined by the difference in the interest rate and the rate of growth in potential
output, provincial fiscal policy choices will result in the accumulation of debt even when at full
employment levels and growth rates of output. We argue that such a value for the policy
component reflects a failure of government to respond to trends in its economic environment in
a way that guarantees fiscal sustainability over the long-term.
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Observing a positive (negative) value for the policy component in a year of economic
contraction (expansion) might be interpreted as indicative of a discretionary counter-cyclical
policy. If so, one might judge it to be a desirable policy intervention.25 However, this
interpretation requires accepting that discretionary provincial fiscal policies — particularly
those stemming from changes in the government’s operating account — have a favourable
influence on output and/or the Bank of Canada’s interest rate policies. If a provincial
government recognizes, as we believe it should, that its fiscal policies can have no significant
effect on output or market interest rates, then the effects of a positive policy component is
negligible in the short term and, to the extent it results in an increase in the risk premium on its
debt, negative in the long-term. A provincial government wishing to stimulate a contracting
economy is generally advised to rely on its capital budget for this purpose; the idea being that
investments in public infrastructure complementary to private production will have maximum
stimulative and long-term benefits on the economy. This advice has the added benefit of
steering governments away from using its operating account — where spending is dominated
by health care, education and social services — to fund temporary expansions and contractions
in their budgets.
POLITICAL BOX SCORE: ONTARIO
Another interpretation of the pattern exhibited by the black bars is one associated with politics.
For this purpose, party affiliations of the government in power are identified in Figure 1.
Summing the increases in the debt ratio caused by the policy choices of the government in
power allows one to identify what some might suggest is the proclivity of certain political
parties to add or subtract government debt. The results of this exercise, reported in the table
above, confirms, for Ontario, the stereotype of governments on the right of the political
spectrum maintaining more fiscally-conservative policies while those on the left choose to
maintain a “looser” set of fiscal policies.
Quebec
Figure 2 presents the same information as Figure 1 but does so using data describing the
finances of the government of Quebec. The same vertical scale on the two figures is used to
enable an easier comparison of the results for the two provinces. Cyclical influences have been
generally larger in Quebec, while the policy influences have generally been larger in Ontario.
Over the entire period from 1982-83 to 2011-12, the debt ratio in Quebec increased by 8.4
percentage points of GDP.
25 We thank Bev Dahlby for raising this point.
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Years as government 11 14 5
Total debt accumulated as a result of policy choices (p.p. of GDP) -3.2 +5.7 +10.6
Average amount of debt accumulated as a result of policy -0.3 +0.4 +2.1
choices per year (p.p. of GDP)
Governing Party Conservative Liberal New 
Democratic
FIGURE 2: QUEBEC
As in Ontario, in Quebec, the recessions of the early 1980s, early 1990s and the more recent
recession starting in 2008 caused the debt ratio to increase. Over the entire period from 1982-
83 to 2011-12, the business cycle was responsible for adding 1.6 percentage points of GDP to
Quebec’s debt ratio.26 The remaining debt accumulated by the operating account, equal to 6.8
percentage points of GDP, was due to the policy choices of the provincial government.
POLITICAL BOX SCORE: QUEBEC
As per Ontario, it is interesting to observe how the amount of debt accumulated as a
consequence of policy choices is related to the government in power. Whereas the policy
component in Ontario is consistent with the stereotype of governments on the right of the
political spectrum maintaining more fiscally-conservative policies with those on the left
choosing to maintain a “looser” set of fiscal policies, in Quebec, the evidence is less supportive
of the usual right-left stereotype. During their 12 years on power, the Parti Québécois, an
unabashedly left-wing party, added a total of just 0.3 percentage points of GDP to the debt
ratio, and so, on average maintained a virtual balance on the current account. The Liberals
exhibited more schizophrenic behaviour with the government of Robert Bourassa adding large
amounts of debt — and doing so in every year of its mandate — while the government of Jean
Charest did the opposite.
26 Reporting only that portion of the cyclical component resulting from n being different from n* one determines what
role automatic stabilizers played in debt accumulation. The calculation for Quebec is similar to that for Ontario; over
the 32 years of the sample period automatic stabilizers increased the debt ratio by only 1.38 percentage points. 
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Years as government 12 9 9
Total debt accumulated as a result of policy choices (p.p. of GDP) +0.3 +9.9 -3.5
Average amount of debt accumulated as a result of policy choices 
per year (p.p. of GDP) +0.03 +1.1 -0.4
Governing Party Parti Liberal
Québécois Bourassa Charest
Comparing the two provinces, one observes a broadly similar pattern whereby policy choices
lead to a rapid accumulation of debt during the 1980s and early 1990s. The latter half of the
1990s and the 2000s were periods of policy-induced retrenchments. More recently, and
particularly in Ontario, there has been a return to policy-induced debt accumulation.
LOOKING AHEAD
The purpose of defining an operating account is for governments to be clear that the
expenditures in that account are such that they ought to balance, or balance as closely as
possible, with revenues over the long term. Over a long enough period of time, one expects the
accumulated deficits of the current account to sum to zero.
The government of Quebec would appear to appreciate the logic of reducing the accumulated
deficit on its current account; it has stated a goal of halving the size of this debt, as a fraction
of GDP, by 2025-26.27 No similar commitment can be found on the part of the government of
Ontario beyond a vague statement in which it commits to reducing its debt ratio to pre-
recession levels sometime in the future.28
Suppose one accepts that both provinces understand the need to reduce the accumulated
deficits on their current accounts. What would be the budget implications? 
Ontario
As a first step to understanding what Ontario needs to do in the future, it is useful to observe
the size of the policy component in the last year of this sample (2011-12). In Ontario, the
policy component in that year was equal to +1.1 per cent of GDP. This means that the setting
of tax rates and the design of spending programs were such that the debt ratio would increase
by 1.1 percentage points per year even assuming the economy of Ontario was operating at full
employment.29
27 See Quebec Budget 2013-14. The commitment is to reduce the accumulated deficit on the current account to 17 per
cent of GDP by 2025-26. Due to changes to government accounting that have been introduced over the 30 years of
our sample, the size of the accumulated deficit on the current account at the end of fiscal year 2012 that is calculated
by the government – 34 per cent of GDP – differs somewhat from ours (28.6 per cent). By our estimates, for Ontario
to return to its pre-recession debt ratio, it would need to reduce it by 6.4 percentage points or by about one-quarter.
28 See Ontario Budget 2013-14.
29 As seen in Figure 1, 2011-12 was not an anomaly. From 2009-10 to 2011-12, the estimate of the value of PDEF*
averaged +$3.7 billion. This compares to an average value of -$6.4 billion during the three years prior to 2009-10.
The policy component during these years was equal to 1.9, 1.2 and 1.1 percentage points of GDP.
14
As shown in equation (2) above, there are two possible reasons for this result. One is the
difference between the interest rate paid on government debt, r, and the rate of growth in
potential output, n*. As discussed below, this difference normally causes the debt ratio to grow.
That was, in fact, the case in 2011-12. The other reason is the size of the primary deficit at full
employment, PDEF*. The government of Ontario established tax rates and designed spending
programs which, since 2009-10, yielded large positive values of PDEF*. The government,
then, was making fiscal policy choices that would cause both sources of change in the policy
component — the difference in r and n* and the size of PDEF* — to add to the debt ratio.
In 2011-12, Ontario was operating below potential as it continued its prolonged recovery from
recession. However, the economy was expanding toward potential, and so, the rate of growth in
GDP, n, exceeded the rate of growth in potential output, n*. The net effect of being below
potential output but growing closer to it — a net effect measured by the cyclical component —
was a very small addition to the debt ratio. The increase in the debt ratio in 2011-12, then, was
almost wholly due to the fiscal policy choices of the Ontario government.
Looking ahead, the government of Ontario faces a number of challenges related to its fiscal
policy choices. Economic conditions are improving with the result that the change in the debt
ratio due to cyclical component has all but disappeared. The challenge is now to reduce the
size of the cyclically-adjusted primary deficit, PDEF*. In particular, it needs to be adjusted
from a positive to a negative value (i.e., from a cyclically-adjusted primary deficit to a
cyclically-adjusted primary surplus). This is necessary simply to halt the growth in the debt
ratio; to reduce the ratio requires still stronger measures.
One gains an understanding of the choices to be faced by the government of Ontario by using
equation (2) to forecast what future budgets might need to deal with. For this exercise, it is
assumed that in 2012-13, the economy of Ontario settles to and remains at a level of GDP
equal to its potential level (i.e., assuming Y = Y* and n = n*). The implication of this
assumption is that the primary deficit adjusts to its cyclically-adjusted value (i.e., PDEF =
PDEF*). Finally, it is assumed that the interest rate paid on Ontario government debt remains
constant at 3.5 percentage points above the rate of potential GDP growth (i.e., (r – n*) =
0.035).30 
With these assumptions, and assuming the size of the cyclically-adjusted primary deficit as a
fraction of GDP remains constant at its 2011-12 value, the ratio of accumulated deficits to GDP
(the debt ratio) rises steadily from 23.4 per cent to 41.5 per cent of GDP by 2025-26. 
Clearly, Ontario has some hard decisions to make in order to hit its target of returning the debt
ratio to pre-recession levels (about 18 per cent), never mind any longer-term goal to reduce this
debt altogether.
30 The choice of this value reflects three considerations. First, Canada is generally recognized as a dynamically-efficient
economy. The implication is that it will usually be the case that the rate of interest will exceed the rate of economic
growth. Second, values for Ontario and Quebec averaged about four per cent during the last few years of the period
of analysis and were slowly falling. Finally, evidence from the IMF (Julio Escolano, “A Practical Guide to Public
Debt Dynamics, Fiscal Sustainability, and Cyclical Adjustment of Budgetary Aggregates,” IMF Technical Notes and
Manuals, January 2010) suggests a similar value (3.8 per cent) for Canada using data that excludes the recent period
of lower interest rates. The assumed value of 3.5 per cent should, therefore, be understood to be conservative in the
sense of requiring smaller adjustments in taxation and spending to meet the targets defined in this section than would
otherwise be the case.
15
What are some possibilities? Nothing can be done to reduce the debt ratio that does not involve
turning what is now a cyclically-adjusted primary deficit into a surplus. This requires, at
minimum, a $1.7 billion increase in taxes, cut to spending, or some combination of those
options. But that will not be nearly enough; this will only slow the rate of increase in the debt
ratio. By 2025-26, a fiscal response of this size, even if implemented immediately, will only
cause the debt ratio to hit 37 per cent, rather than 41.5 per cent, of GDP. Something more
drastic is required. An immediate and permanent increase in taxes, cuts to spending or some
combination of these options of $7 billion would, assuming that thereafter the primary balance
grows at the rate of potential GDP, hold the debt ratio constant at its current value. To actually
reduce the debt ratio from its current value would require a still larger adjustment. For
example, an immediate and permanent increase in taxes (or cut to spending) of $9.3 billion
would put the debt ratio on a downward trajectory toward a value of 18 per cent of GDP by
2025-26.
How big is a $9.3 billion adjustment to the primary deficit? Were the adjustment made solely
via a spending cut, it would require an eight per cent cut to the level of total program spending
observed in 2011-12. This cut, spread across spending on health, education and social services
in proportion to the fraction of program spending going to those categories, would require a
$3.8 billion cut to health spending, a $2.5 billion cut to education spending, and an $1 billion
cut to spending on social services with the remaining $1.8 billion coming from other spending
cuts. If instead, the adjustment was made with revenue increases, it would require, for example,
a 3.5 percentage point increase in the HST (from 13 per cent to 16.5 per cent), a doubling of
the corporation income tax, or a 40 per cent increase in the personal income tax (all using
2011-12 values). Of course, some combination of spending cuts and tax increases would also
work.
A $9.3 billion adjustment to the primary deficit would mean turning the 2011-12 cyclically-
adjusted deficit of $1.7 billion into a surplus of $7.6 billion. This would not be an
extraordinary value for the cyclically-adjusted primary balance. In fact, by these calculations,
Ontario had a cyclically-adjusted primary surplus equal to $7.6 billion as recently as 2007-08.
It would mean, then, undoing some fairly recent policy changes. Between 2007-08 and 2011-
12, it is estimated that program spending, (adjusted for the business cycle), increased by $17
billion (19 per cent) while revenues increased by $8.5 billion (or eight per cent).31 What is
necessary, then, is to reverse the recent tendency to increase spending without the extra tax
revenue to fund that spending. It means a return to what was a policy in place only a few years
ago; a policy of maintaining a cyclically-adjusted primary surplus of between $7 and $8
billion. This can be done either by increasing tax rates so as to allow revenue to catch up to
spending, by reversing recent increases in spending commitments, or some combination of
these choices.
31 About half of that increase in spending was on Health and about one-third was on Education. Spending on all of the
“Big Three” of provincial spending responsibilities — Health, Education and Social Services — increased at rates
well in excess of the increase in cyclically-adjusted tax revenue. The fastest growing of the three categories was
Health.
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An immediate $9.3 billion adjustment in Ontario’s primary balance in not necessary. A more
gradual adjustment — for example, raising taxes or cutting spending by $3.4 billion per year in
each of the next three years — would have the same success at reducing the debt ratio to 18
per cent of GDP though, as this example illustrates, slowing the pace of adjustment increases
the size of the total adjustment required. Many options are available but they must all involve
turning what is currently a cyclically-adjusted primary deficit into a surplus and this requires
much more than simply slowing the rate of growth in the size of the primary balance.
While on the one hand, one might suggest a gradual adjustment to cyclically-adjusted primary
balance, on the other, one might suggest a rather more ambitious target for the debt ratio than
simply returning it to its pre-recession level. After all, the idea of identifying an operating
account in government budgeting is to more easily identify the bills that need to be paid by
current as opposed to future tax payers. The aim, then, would be to target a zero value for the
accumulated debt.
Wary of trying to peer too far into the future or asking for too rapid an adjustment, another
exercise considered here is to ask only what policy choices are necessary to establish a debt
ratio of 10 per cent by 2025-26. Assuming the extra adjustment takes place early, an additional
year of $3.4 billion spending cuts or tax increases — in addition to the three straight years of
cuts required to reduce the ratio to pre-recession levels — would do the trick.
Quebec
In Quebec, the policy component in 2011-12 was equal to -0.3 per cent of GDP. This means
that the setting of tax rates and the design of spending programs were such that the debt ratio
would decrease by 0.3 percentage points per year assuming the economy of Quebec is at full
employment. 
In 2011-12, Quebec was operating slightly below potential as it too continued its prolonged
recovery from recession. Like Ontario, the economy was expanding toward potential, and so,
the rate of growth in GDP exceeded the rate of growth in potential output. The net effect of
being below potential output but growing closer to it — a net effect measured by the cyclical
component — was to pull the debt ratio slightly upward (see Figure 2). The decrease in the
debt ratio in 2011-12, then, was wholly due to the fiscal policy choices of the Quebec
government.
As noted above, the change in the debt ratio due to government policy reflects the combined
influences of the difference in the interest rate paid on Quebec government debt (r) and the rate
of growth in potential output (n*), and the size of the cyclically-adjusted primary deficit,
PDEF*. The first influence, due to the difference in r and n*, is to push the debt ratio upward.
The fact that Quebec’s policy component was dragging the debt ratio lower in 2011-12 is, then,
solely due to the government having set tax rates and designing spending programs in a way to
yield a negative value of the cyclically-adjusted primary deficit. In other words, the falling debt
ratio is due to the government of Quebec making fiscal policy choices that yield a sizable
cyclically-adjusted primary surplus. We estimate the size of cyclically-adjusted primary surplus
to have been $4.3 billion in 2011-12.
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Looking ahead, the government of Quebec has more favourable policy options to choose from
than has the government of Ontario. Quebec’s fiscal policy choices are already causing the debt
ratio to fall; the only question is whether the current rate of decrease is sufficient to hit the
government’s 2025-26 target for the debt ratio.32
Just as was done with Ontario, one can gain an understanding of the choices to be faced by the
government of Quebec by using equation (2) to forecast what future budgets might need to
deal with. To do this, it was again assumed that in 2012-13 the economy of Quebec settled to
and remains at a level of GDP equal to its potential level and that as a result the cyclical
component is set to zero. As with Ontario, it is assumed that the interest rate paid on Quebec
government debt remains constant at 3.5 percentage points above the rate of potential GDP
growth (i.e., (r – n*) = 0.035).
With these assumptions, and assuming the size of the cyclically-adjusted primary deficit
remains constant at its 2011-12 values as a fraction of GDP, the debt ratio falls, but only
slightly, from 28.6 per cent to 24.8 per cent of GDP by 2025-26. This leaves the debt ratio
above the level the government of Quebec has identified as its target level to be reached in
2025-26 (18 per cent). Quebec, then, also needs to make an adjustment to the size of its
primary balance. An advantage Quebec has over Ontario is that because the balance is already
in surplus, a relatively small adjustment is required. For example, an immediate one-time cut to
spending or increase in revenue (or some combination) that increases the size of the primary
surplus by $1.4 billion would be enough to lower the debt ratio to 18 per cent by 2025-26. A
cut of $1.4 billion is equal to just over two per cent of program spending (using 2011-12
values), and so, is considerably less than the adjustments required in Ontario. Smaller annual
adjustments spread over a number years could yield the same result.33
Finally, as was done with Ontario, it is possible to ask what it would take for the government
of Quebec to hit a more ambitious target for its debt ratio. It turns out that a second year of
spending cuts or tax increases equal to $1.4 billion — would be sufficient to reduce the debt
ratio to 10 per cent by 2025-26. 
CONCLUSION
As recently emphasized by Busby and Robson,34 nothing is simple when it comes to working
with government financial data. Yet, an understanding of what drives the accumulation of
government debt requires a time series describing government finances that is internally
consistent insofar as the effect of spending and revenue choices on debt can be clearly
identified. One of the contributions of this report is to provide such information for the
governments of Ontario and Quebec. 
32 The significance of having established a negative value for the primary deficit is apparent when one recognizes that
were the government of Quebec willing to simply hold the ratio of accumulated deficit to GDP constant, it could
increase spending and/or cut taxes by about $100 million in every year to 2025-26.
33 In Quebec, spending on Health was been responsible for 55 per cent of the increase in program spending between
2007-08 and 2011-12. As was the case in Ontario, the increase in spending on all of the Big Three of provincial
spending responsibilities increased faster than cyclically-adjusted revenue. The fastest growing of the three categories
was, as in Ontario, Health.
34
“Credibility and the Bottom Line.”
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The second contribution of this paper is to define an accounting framework that allows one to
identify how much government debt has been accumulated as a consequence of policy choices
as opposed to the effects of the business cycle. This framework shows that using the size of the
cyclically-adjusted primary deficit (PDEF*) for this purpose is wrong. It is wrong because it
assumes that governments are not responsible for paying the interest on the debts they have
inherited from previous governments. It is also wrong because this metric fails to recognize
that changes in the economic environment demand a response in the form of adjustments to tax
rates and/or changes in the design of programs. This paper’s accounting framework corrects
these shortcomings.
The final contribution made by this paper is to show how this framework can be used to look
backwards to evaluate the extent to which policy choices have contributed to changes in the
debt ratio, and forward to offer commentary on what future policy choices need to be made to
hit certain targets for the debt ratio. These calculations show that, while over certain periods,
the business cycle has played a role in debt accumulation, over the 30 years described by our
data, the effects of economic booms and busts have been offsetting in their influence on
government debt in Ontario and Quebec. Virtually all of the debt incurred by these
governments has therefore been the result of policy choices. Looking ahead, both governments
need to impose increases in tax rates and/or lower levels of public services in order to reduce
their debt levels. The burden of these adjustments will be considerably heavier for the citizens
of Ontario to carry than those required of the citizens of Quebec.
As a final comment, it is important to note that this paper has only examined the changes in the
accumulated deficits of the operating accounts of these two provinces. Thus, the focus has been
on the accumulation of $224 billion of debt in Ontario and $153 billion in Quebec over the
period 1980/81 to 2011/12. As noted earlier, this paper has not discussed the accumulation of
over $81 billion in Ontario and $67 billion in Quebec that is the result of government
borrowing to finance extraordinary expenditures on bailouts, privatizations and purchases of
infrastructure. If one were to assume, perhaps heroically, that all of that latter borrowing was
the result of policy decisions that accurately balanced the benefits of such spending accruing to
future tax payers to the taxes they will pay, then the benefits and costs of that debt have been
balanced and that debt is not a serious concern. The same, however, cannot be said of debt
incurred on a government’s operating account where taxation is meant to balance the costs of
providing goods and services to current taxpayers. That debt, then, is a whole different kettle of
fish.
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APPENDIX
The following two tables present the provincial budget data used in this study. These data
comes from the Public Accounts of the two provinces and are measured in millions of nominal
dollars.
These data relate to the General Fund (Quebec) and the Operations Account (Ontario) only. As
explained in the text, the Accumulated Deficit is the sum of the Annual Deficits in these
accounts. The Accumulated Deficit differs from the Net Debt as the latter includes the
accumulated deficits from government funds other than the General Fund and the Operating
Fund. 
Similar data are contained in the Fiscal Reference Tables (FRT) published by the federal
Department of Finance. However, the data in the following tables goes beyond what is found in
the FRT by reporting not only total spending and total revenue but also revenues and
expenditures by categories. This breakdown of revenue and expenditures by sub-categories is
necessary to cyclically-adjust the deficit and, so, the accumulated deficit.
The FRT adds a column, “Other”, that represents the net balance (revenue — expenditure) of
all government funds other than the General Fund and the Operations Account. The deficit
reported in the FRT is not, therefore, the deficit of the General Fund and Operating Fund but is,
rather, the deficit of the provincial consolidated budget. 
Accounting reforms in 1997-98 caused the Government of Quebec to re-state amounts
previously reported in its public accounts. This paper reports the values as originally reported
rather than try to unravel the implications of these accounting changes. The difference in this
data versus the data reported in the FRT for Quebec is minor.
A difference between the data for Ontario and those data presented in the FRT is for years
1993-94 to 2000-01. For those years, FRT data in the category ‘Own Source Revenues’ are
higher and Total Program Expenditures are lower — by the same amounts — than is reported
in the following table. For those years the FRT allocated an amount from Total Program
Expenditures to Own Source Revenues to reflect a change in the government’s treatment of
education property tax revenues. The FRT attempts to make this adjustment only for the years
1993-94 to 2000-01. In constructing the data set provided below, no attempt was made to make
this adjustment. Instead, it reports revenues and expenditures as reported in the Public
Accounts when published. It is noteworthy that the adjustments reported in the FRT have no
impact on the size of the Ontario deficit/surplus. The deficit/surplus reported in the FRT (which
is the same as we report) does not equal the change in Net Debt reported in the FRT. The Net
Debt figure in the FRT therefore includes the debt implications of extraordinary expenditures
such as the impact of electricity market restructuring.
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Quebec
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1980-81 5,374 1,515 1,962 3,894 1,727 14,472 5,070 1,530 5,499 4,472 16,571 1,382 17,953 3,481 14,326 14,326
1981-82 6,119 2,285 2,087 4,473 2,778 17,742 5,826 1,704 6,016 4,867 18,413 1,950 20,363 2,621 16,947 12,569
1982-83 6,526 2,235 2,275 5,172 3,349 19,557 6,174 2,124 6,270 5,152 19,720 2,300 22,020 2,463 19,410 15,038
1983-84 6,959 2,001 2,655 6,227 3,799 21,641 6,600 2,475 6,510 5,709 21,294 2,511 23,805 2,164 21,574 17,298
1984-85 7,348 2,506 2,991 6,236 2,984 22,065 7,175 2,652 6,876 6,223 22,926 3,012 25,938 3,873 25,447 21,455
1985-86 8,150 2,683 3,630 6,178 3,332 23,973 7,677 2,678 7,464 6,273 24,092 3,354 27,446 3,473 28,920 25,735
1986-87 8,657 3,046 4,124 5,828 3,698 25,353 8,175 2,760 7,749 6,085 24,769 3,556 28,325 2,972 31,892 28,716
1987-88 9,779 3,521 4,568 6,117 4,124 28,109 8,857 2,906 8,692 6,375 26,830 3,675 30,505 2,396 34,288 31,115
1988-89 10,377 3,740 4,870 6,386 4,379 29,752 9,576 2,787 8,684 6,607 27,654 3,802 31,456 1,704 35,992 32,819
1989-90 10,777 4,359 5,113 6,674 4,110 31,033 10,299 2,930 8,468 7,085 28,782 4,015 32,797 1,764 37,756 34,583
1990-91 12,211 4,353 5,353 6,972 4,156 33,045 11,312 3,018 9,430 7,823 31,583 4,437 36,020 2,975 40,731 37,558
1991-92 12,502 4,621 6,158 6,747 4,439 34,467 12,341 3,623 9,969 8,169 34,102 4,666 38,768 4,301 45,032 41,885
1992-93 12,102 4,664 6,000 7,764 4,795 35,325 12,697 4,061 10,360 8,481 35,599 4,756 40,355 5,030 50,062 46,914
1993-94 12,313 4,885 5,583 7,762 5,384 35,927 13,010 4,725 10,231 7,568 35,534 5,316 40,850 4,923 54,985 51,837
1994-95 12,453 5,423 5,430 7,494 5,509 36,309 13,137 4,874 10,521 7,716 36,248 5,882 42,130 5,821 60,806 57,677
1995-96 12,988 6,211 5,614 8,126 5,187 38,126 13,101 5,006 10,453 7,479 36,039 6,034 42,073 3,947 64,753 61,624
1996-97 13,220 6,699 5,213 6,704 5,390 37,226 12,920 4,943 10,040 6,680 34,583 5,855 40,438 3,212 67,965 64,833
1997-98 14,531 7,336 5,488 5,656 3,060 36,071 12,923 5,057 9,449 5,553 32,982 7,039 40,021 3,950 71,915 88,597
1998-99 15,400 7,523 6,426 7,813 3,587 40,749 14,596 5,672 9,580 5,534 35,382 6,853 42,235 1,486 73,401 88,810
1999-00 16,074 7,934 6,761 6,064 4,648 41,481 14,831 5,598 9,825 5,748 36,002 7,035 43,037 1,556 74,957 89,162
2000-01 16,984 8,705 7,374 7,895 4,384 45,342 16,095 5,530 10,124 6,568 38,317 7,248 45,565 223 75,180 88,208
2001-02 15,274 8,320 7,294 8,885 4,750 44,523 17,186 5,167 10,615 7,106 40,074 6,930 47,004 2,481 77,661 92,772
2002-03 15,597 7,803 8,051 8,932 5,850 46,233 17,872 5,457 11,166 7,339 41,834 6,804 48,638 2,405 80,066 95,601
2003-04 15,715 8,541 8,658 9,370 5,905 48,189 19,063 5,655 11,568 7,041 43,327 6,850 50,177 1,988 82,054 97,025
2004-05 16,324 9,127 9,241 9,229 6,377 50,298 20,622 5,624 11,874 7,332 45,452 7,035 52,487 2,189 84,243 99,042
2005-06 16,449 9,833 9,614 9,969 6,478 52,343 21,163 5,677 12,280 7,645 46,765 7,042 53,807 1,464 85,707 104,683
2006-07 18,480 9,832 9,873 11,015 7,999 57,199 22,453 5,853 12,638 8,078 49,022 7,185 56,207 -992 84,715 124,297
2007-08 17,887 9,993 10,011 13,629 7,990 59,510 24,054 5,944 13,399 8,377 51,774 7,160 58,934 -576 84,139 124,681
2008-09 17,103 9,547 10,472 14,023 8,030 59,175 25,621 6,137 14,321 9,118 55,197 6,639 61,836 2,661 86,800 134,237
2009-10 16,459 9,398 10,473 15,161 7,799 59,290 27,466 6,372 14,653 9,724 58,215 6,240 64,455 5,165 91,965 151,608
2010-11 17,913 9,613 11,468 15,425 8,231 62,650 28,514 6,553 15,195 9,716 59,978 7,084 67,062 4,412 96,377 159,333
2011-12 18,980 10,140 13,159 15,243 7,993 65,515 29,341 6,783 15,634 9,745 61,503 7,348 68,851 3,336 99,713 167,111
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Ontario
22
1980-81 3,578 1,792 2,562 3,025 4,088 15,045 4,867 1,516 3,790 5,114 15,287 1,055 16,342 1,297 11,988 11,988
1981-82 4,928 1,769 2,853 3,308 4,433 17,291 5,784 1,761 4,353 5,964 17,862 1,209 19,071 1,780 13,768 13,755
1982-83 5,858 1,361 3,420 3,345 4,835 18,819 6,746 2,113 4,644 6,943 20,446 1,562 22,008 3,189 16,957 16,942
1983-84 5,994 1,583 3,876 4,161 5,344 20,958 7,568 2,390 5,058 7,015 22,031 2,080 24,111 3,153 20,110 20,182
1984-85 6,253 2,248 4,426 4,578 5,883 23,388 8,328 2,592 5,310 7,300 23,530 2,417 25,947 2,559 22,669 22,848
1985-86 7,249 2,575 5,025 4,682 6,254 25,785 9,245 2,859 5,845 7,655 25,604 2,795 28,399 2,614 25,283 28,919
1986-87 8,618 3,205 5,604 4,870 6,919 29,216 10,480 3,270 6,805 8,083 28,638 3,211 31,849 2,633 27,916 31,531
1987-88 9,859 3,600 6,305 4,984 7,410 32,158 11,976 4,322 7,195 7,678 31,171 3,476 34,647 2,489 30,405 34,020
1988-89 11,687 4,223 7,775 5,113 8,193 36,991 13,043 4,941 7,753 8,966 34,703 3,767 38,470 1,479 31,884 35,499
1989-90 13,518 4,720 8,549 5,364 9,074 41,225 14,333 5,717 8,299 8,969 37,318 3,817 41,135 -90 31,794 35,409
1990-91 15,440 3,800 8,175 5,762 9,715 42,892 15,978 7,155 8,981 10,031 42,145 3,776 45,921 3,029 34,823 38,438
1991-92 13,712 3,184 7,487 6,324 10,046 40,753 17,582 9,207 10,158 10,540 47,487 4,196 51,683 10,930 45,753 49,368
1992-93 13,543 2,713 7,316 7,554 10,681 41,807 17,755 10,339 9,507 11,341 48,942 5,293 54,235 12,428 58,181 61,796
1993-94 14,723 3,447 8,124 7,071 10,309 43,674 17,684 9,242 9,590 11,231 47,747 7,129 54,876 11,202 69,383 80,599
1994-95 14,758 4,557 9,090 7,607 10,027 46,039 17,848 9,436 9,421 11,631 48,336 7,832 56,168 10,129 79,512 90,728
1995-96 15,633 5,174 9,424 7,880 11,362 49,473 17,775 8,830 9,761 13,432 49,798 8,475 58,273 8,800 88,312 101,864
1996-97 16,357 5,852 9,964 5,778 11,763 49,714 18,905 8,081 8,957 11,805 47,748 8,607 56,355 6,641 94,953 108,769
1997-98 16,293 7,456 10,843 5,098 13,092 52,782 19,034 8,098 9,818 10,805 47,755 8,729 56,484 3,702 98,655 112,735
1998-99 17,190 7,447 11,651 4,515 15,247 56,050 19,743 7,686 11,367 10,240 49,036 9,016 58,052 2,002 100,657 114,737
1999-00 17,617 8,095 12,879 5,885 20,566 65,042 22,001 7,532 11,974 11,840 53,347 11,027 64,374 -668 99,989 134,398
2000-01 17,911 9,200 13,735 6,129 19,319 66,294 22,852 7,856 10,986 11,825 53,519 10,873 64,392 -1,902 98,087 132,496
2001-02 19,097 6,646 13,803 7,754 25,007 72,307 24,128 8,082 11,752 17,633 61,595 10,337 71,932 -375 97,712 132,121
2002-03 18,195 7,459 14,183 8,894 25,944 74,675 26,156 8,300 12,782 17,626 64,864 9,694 74,558 -117 97,595 132,647
2003-04 18,301 6,658 14,258 9,893 25,439 74,549 29,381 8,571 13,911 18,565 70,428 9,604 80,032 5,483 103,078 138,816
2004-05 19,320 9,883 14,855 11,882 28,252 84,192 31,634 9,153 15,465 20,127 76,379 9,368 85,747 1,555 104,633 140,921
2005-06 21,041 9,984 15,554 13,251 30,908 90,738 32,903 9,998 16,315 22,205 81,421 9,019 90,440 -298 104,335 152,702
2006-07 23,655 10,845 16,228 14,036 32,356 97,120 35,655 10,455 17,446 22,464 86,020 8,831 94,851 -2,269 102,066 153,742
2007-08 25,472 12,990 16,745 16,597 32,311 104,115 38,108 11,282 25,561 19,650 94,601 8,914 103,515 -600 101,466 156,616
2008-09 25,738 6,748 17,021 16,591 31,434 97,532 40,734 11,215 26,602 16,824 95,375 8,566 103,941 6,409 107,875 169,585
2009-10 23,421 6,227 17,059 18,620 30,986 96,313 43,054 12,211 28,632 22,959 106,856 8,719 115,575 19,262 127,137 193,589
2010-11 23,711 9,067 18,813 23,041 32,543 107,175 44,414 12,802 29,913 24,577 111,706 9,480 121,186 14,011 141,148 214,511
2011-12 24,548 9,944 20,159 21,305 33,817 109,773 46,503 13,290 30,721 22,146 112,660 10,082 122,742 12,969 154,117 235,582
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